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Abstract Recent trends in the provision of
infrastructure development indicate that the private
sector is playing an increasingly important role in the
procurement process. This trend has partly arisen out of
a necessity for the development of infrastructure to be
undertaken at a rate that maintains and allows growth.
This has become a major challenge for many countries
where it is evident that these provisions cannot be met
by government alone. The emergence of Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer (BOOT) schemes as a response to this
challenge provides a means for developing the
infrastructure of a country without directly impacting
upon the government’s budgetary constraints. The
concepts of BOOT are without doubt extremely
complex arrangements, which bring to the construction
sector risks not experienced previously. This paper
examines perceptions of BOOT schemes in order to
develop a framework of critical success factors. The
developed framework is then tested against a case
study of Stadium Australia, and the outcomes of the
comparison are discussed.
Keywords BOOT, case study, critical success factors,
infrastructure challenge, public–private partnerships,
Stadium Australia
INTRODUCTION
According to McDermott (1999), a significant devel-
opment in construction procurement has been the
rapid increase in the use of Build-Own-Operate-Trans-
fer (BOOT) arrangements. There is a growing trend for
governments and other clients in the construction
industry to place major projects into the private sector
(Angeles & Walker, 2000). The private sector is playing
an increasingly important role in this trend that has
partly risen out of a necessity for the development of
infrastructure to be undertaken at a rate that maintains
and allows growth. This in turn has become a major
challenge for many countries, and particularly so where
it is evident that these provisions cannot be met by the
government alone, as they have typically been in the
past.
The emergence of BOOT schemes as a response to
this challenge, provides a means for developing the
infrastructure of a country without directly impacting
on the government’s budgetary constraints. With the
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) family of procurement
options an alliance or joint venture group forms to
provide a facility for a client for which the client makes
a concession agreement to fund the facility until that
facility’s ownership is transferred to the client. This
arrangement is more common for infrastructure pro-
jects than buildings because the concession allows for
tolls or other payments to be made by end-users to
cover the cost of both procuring the facility and its
operation (Walker et al., 2000).
Many countries have now embarked on infrastruc-
ture projects procured via BOOT or the use of similar
methods. The scheme is now widely practiced and
spreads among a diverse range of countries from
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, UK and the US to
countries like India, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and
the Philippines ( Walker & Smith, 1995). Most of these
projects are financed on a limited recourse basis and
built and operated as a private venture under a project
agreement involving the host government.
Many of the infrastructure partnerships between
public and private sectors in the past are yet to provide
evidence of successful completion, as few of the
concession periods have expired. Therefore, the aim
of this paper is to examine the perceptions of BOOT
schemes in order to establish a framework of critical
success factors that can be tested and developed against
a case study undertaken on a current project.
It became evident several decades ago that govern-
ments globally had major shortcomings in funding
public works. The fundamental influences from these
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issues are what have developed the trends towards
privatization and more specifically infrastructure
procurement strategies such as BOOT. According to
Walker & Smith (1995), the infrastructures of ‘devel-
oped’ countries such as those of western Europe,
North America, Japan and Australia are under strain
from two principal influences. First, the existing and
limited infrastructure is unable to keep pace with the
growth of the country and secondly, the demand for
health and welfare because of an ageing population.
Walker & Smith (1995) also acknowledge the
problems and challenges for ‘newly industrialized
countries’ such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Mexico and South Africa. Here the common problem,
defined as urbanization, is caused by a population
explosion placing heavy demand on an already limited
infrastructure.
The New South Wales ( NSW ) Government has an
enviable reputation for working with the private sector
in the provision of public infrastructure – particularly in
relation to road, rail and Olympic infrastructure. The
government has provided guidelines in its publication
‘Guidelines for Private Sector Participation in the
Provision of Public Infrastructure’, which is reviewed
regularly and most recently updated in October 1997.
Since the last evaluation there has been considerable
international attention towards partnerships between
the private and public sectors. A review is timely. The
latest government Green Paper ‘Working with Govern-
ment – Private Financing of Infrastructure and Certain
Government Services in NSW’ attempts to capture this
opportunity to increase the benefits and comment on
the issues and concerns held by the private sector that
may impede development. ‘Working with Government’
is not a policy statement or a detailed explanation of
procedures. The paper is a means of seeking comments
and ideas for how the public sector can better work with
the NSW Government in the delivery of the services
which have a major infrastructure or asset creation
component ( NSW Government, 2000). This is a
welcome opportunity to broaden relationships between
the public and private sectors that may involve inno-
vative recommendations and the formulation of new
policies.
HISTORY OF BOOT PROJECTS
History records that the Industrial Revolution began
when Abraham Darby first smelted coke in 1709.
Urbanization and the need for associated infrastruc-
ture were to follow. Governments of the time had only
rudimentary tax arrangements primarily to service
heads of state. Infrastructure was therefore left to
individuals to finance and build the canals and
railroads of Europe and later those in the America’s,
China and Japan were procured this way (Smith,
1999).
A key historical development in the funding of
infrastructure then occurred from the late 1700s, as
Smith (1999) indicates that tax generated from the
Industrial Revolution meant that Governments were
now able to fund their own infrastructure. But, where
large undertakings were suggested, the concession or
franchise arrangement was adopted. The need for water
distribution initiated the first concession being granted
in 1782 to the Perier Brothers in Paris.
The use of concession contracts declined in indus-
trialized countries as the initial infrastructure was
completed but the wonder of the age, the 195 km
Suez Canal opened for navigation on 17 November
1869 (Smith, 1999). The Suez Canal Company was
empowered by the Egyptian government to build and
operate the canal. The Canal was to be financed by
European capital with Egyptian financial support, and a
concession to design, construct and operate this rev-
enue producing facility was expected (Levy, 1996). The
project agreement for the procurement of the 195 km
Suez Canal was based around a 99-year concession
contract (Walker & Smith, 1995).
Industrial countries generally funded new infra-
structure between the late 1800s and the 1970s from
their respective fiscal resources. However, a series of
influences emerged in the late 1970s which placed
pressures on this established system for both devel-
oped and developing countries. The infrastructures of
‘developed’ countries such as those of western
Europe, North America, Japan and Australia are
under strain from two principal influences. First, the
existing and limited infrastructure is unable to keep
pace with the growth of the country and secondly,
the demand for health and welfare because of an
ageing population. The problems and challenges for
‘newly industrialized countries’ such as Malaysia,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mexico and South Africa are
caused by a population explosion placing heavy
demand on an already limited infrastructure (Walker
& Smith, 1995).
The Suez Canal experience demonstrated that the
concept of private sector participation in infrastructure
provision is not a new idea. It is, however, only in the
last two decades that BOOT concepts have become
high on many government agendas. Australian exam-
ples of the BOT and BOOT approach include the
Sydney Harbour Tunnel, M4 and M5 tollways in New
South Wales and the Ord River Hydro-Electric Scheme
in Western Australia (Angeles & Walker, 2000).
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THE BOOT CONCEPT
According to Smith (1999), the phrase BOOT des-
cribes the earliest concession model, although the late
Turkish Prime Minister, Targut Ozal, is popularly cited
as originating the phrase in the 1980s in connection
with proposals for the construction of power plants in
Turkey. In the BOOT model, ownership of the utility
rests with the concessionaires until the end of the
concession period, at which point both ownership and
operating rights are transferred free of charge to the
host government.
When a private sector group has a concession to
build and toll a motorway project for say 20 years, this
is a BOT. If, however, their concession also allowed
them to own, build and rent warehouse space (for the
concession period of 20 years) at certain locations
along the motorway then the contractual arrangement
in place is described as a BOOT agreement ( Walker &
Smith, 1995).
Most BOOT projects are first identified by the host
government. In advertising or requesting for proposals,
the host government asks for bids to have a particular
project delivered on a BOOT basis. The BOOT
concept uses a well-established approach of financing
the project known as ‘project finance’. Project finance
techniques have been applied in the US to the devel-
opment of commercial real estate, and were further
developed in the 1970s in the North Sea in connection
with oil and gas projects. Now commonly used in
BOOT or similar arrangements, they are being used for
numerous infrastructure projects involving power
plants, roads, railways, bridges and water treatment
plants. The financing of this infrastructure is very
different to the financing of a shopping centre for
example. In equipment or real estate financing, the
lender’s primary security is the capital value of the
asset. Toll roads or power plants, on the other hand,
have uncertain capital value and a very limited potential
for resale. The lender’s primary security therefore, are
the contracts supporting the project and the certainty of
the revenue stream set out in the project agreement
(UNIDO, 1996).
In practice, most BOT or BOOT projects are
financed on a limited or, in some cases, a non-recourse
basis. Non- or limited-recourse financing is a financing
structure in which the main source of debt repayment
or equity return is the assets or returns that result from
the project. The lender is relying on the project assets
and cash flows for repayment and debt service. The
deals are called ‘limited recourse’ when the sponsors’
liability is limited to the amount they invested in the
project if it fails, or ‘non-recourse’ when the sponsors
have no liability for project failure. The non-recourse
approach is only used in cases where the project is
clearly capable of supporting the debt ( Walker &
Smith, 1995).
CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS
The concept of ‘Critical Success Factors’ (CSF) was
developed by Rockart and the Sloan School of Man-
agement with the phrase first used in the context of
information systems and project management. Rockart
defines CSF as:
Those few key areas of activity in which favourable
results are absolutely necessary for a particular
manager to reach his or her own goals...those limited
number of areas where ‘things must go right’
(Rockart, 1982).
Morledge & Owen (1999) developed the concept of
CSF to identify certain weaknesses associated with the
practical application of Rockart’s method. Six main
areas of weakness are listed below:
1. Subjectivity.
2. Bias.
3. Human inability to process complex information.
4. Change in relation to surrounding environments.
time dependency.
5. Imprecise definitions; generalization.
6. Qualitative performance measures.
Rowlinson (1999) states that critical success factors
are those fundamental issues inherent in the project
which must be maintained in order for teamworking to
take place in an efficient and effective manner. They
require day-to-day attention and operate throughout
the life of the project.
A number of authors have identified factors they
consider critical to the success of project procurement
under BOOT or similar concepts. The following list
attempts to summarize these:
• Developed legal/fiscal/economic framework (Tiong,
1990).
• Avoiding delays and cost overruns (Tiong & Alum,
1997).
• Comprehensive feasibility study (Keong et al.,
1997).
• Project management ability and proven expertise
(Salzmann & Mohamed, 1999).
• Having a local partner (Salzmann & Mohamed,
1999).
• Existing infrastructure (Keong et al., 1997).
• Political stability and support (Keong et al., 1997).
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• A well-prepared Environmental Impact Statement
will assist in the binding process (Tiong & Alum,
1997).
• Technical innovation (Tiong et al., 1992).
• Favourable inflation, exchange and interest rates
(Tiong, 1990).
• Financial capability and support (Tiong et al.,
1992).
Tam et al. (1994) developed a ‘five P’s’ framework
for the successful launching of public–private sector
joint venture projects with special significance given to
the power industry in South-east Asia and China. The
authors suggest that:
many companies have found careful planning to be
the simple secret...they researched the market and
its characteristics, found the best partner and pro-
ject, and structured the project to protect their
position and to assure profitability.
Their research concluded that successful planning and
execution involves consideration of the five P’s. This
framework tends to view the success factors from an
investors perspective, wishing to identify and then
establish a project. The five P’s being:
1. Project – identification of suitable projects is the first
critical step.
2. Partner(s) – close attention must be paid to aspects
such as goals, possession of political influence, pro-
vision of equity and possession of project manage-
ment skill.
3. Pattern – investors must consider the structure of the
investment, for instance, the importance of local
participation and representation.
4. Profitability – providing a predictable level of profit.
5. Protection – protecting the relationship created with
the project partners.
Ogunlana (1996) stresses that not all projects are
suitable for procurement by this type of procurement
method, and that given the numerous risks faced,
projects should be in the local interest with government
support, there should be long-term demand for the
service offered by the project with limited competition
from other projects and the legal and political systems
in which the project is situated should be stable.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In their consideration of research methods, particularly
within the construction field, Fellows & Liu (1997)
comment that a case study yields deep but narrow
results. The possibility of the case study results being
‘narrow’ is accepted in that they are restricted to the
case study project in question. The development of a
‘perfect’ BOOT model applicable to ‘all’ infrastructure
projects is not the aim of this research. This is difficult
given the complex, fragmented and unique character-
istics of individual construction projects. However, the
case study will serve to test the validity of the success
factor framework developed from the related literature,
and possibly provide for further refinement as a sound
foundation applicable to BOOT projects in general.
Yin (1984) noted that the single case study method is
an appropriate application where the case in question
represents an extreme or unique case or that the
situation has not previously been the subject of detailed
scientific investigation. Given the fragmented nature of
the construction industry, the many forms of BOOT
procurement and its variations, and the ‘unique’ nature
of commercial infrastructure projects in general, it is
not possible to study either a ‘typical’ project or a group
of projects which represent the entire application.
A single case study has been selected as the most
appropriate means for the research reported in this
paper. Collection of evidence for the case study was
achieved by reviewing the documentation and reports
provided by the consortium stakeholders, government
office and general project literature and an informal
interview process with key management personnel
involved in the project. The research has identified
CSFs from the literature and these CSFs have been
tested and validated through the interview process with
key senior project participants. The case study further
validates these CSFs in a generic ‘real world’ context.
PROJECT BACKGROUND: STADIUM
AUSTRALIA
Following the announcement on 24 September 1993
that Sydney had won the right to host the games of the
XXVII Olympiad, work began on the planning and
development of the facilities. The Olympic Co-ordina-
tion Authority (OCA) was established on 30 June 1995
by the NSW State Government, replacing Homebush
Bay Corporation (HBC) to oversee the process. The
NSW Government issued a call for proposals in August
1994 for private sector investment in the new Olympic
stadium facility. This call was framed around a BOOT
delivery scheme with an intention for the Government
to shortlist successful tenderers (Magub & Hampson,
1999).
Multiplex and Hambros led the private sector con-
sortium, known as Australia Stadium 2000, to respond
to HBC’s invitation for proposals to design, construct,
finance, operate and maintain an Olympic stadium. In
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January 1995, HBC announced a shortlist of three
consortia, including the then named ‘Australia Stadium
2000’ consortium, and a call for detailed proposals was
issued in June 1995. It was at this time that Macquarie
Bank joined the consortium. In September 1995
Obayashi Corporation also joined the consortium
(Stadium Australia Group, 1996a).
In January 1996 negotiations began with the ‘Aus-
tralia Stadium 2000’ consortium as the preferred
proponent to build, finance and operate the Sydney
Olympic Stadium (Magub & Hampson, 1999). It was
not until August 1996 that the OCA then awarded the
proposal to design, construct and operate the facility to
the ‘Australia Stadium 2000’ consortium. The Stadium
Australia Trust and OCA signed the project agreement
in September 1996 (Stadium Australia Group, 1996a).
Although the stadium evolved as a result of Sydney’s
successful bid for the 2000 Olympics, the project is now
being run by Stadium Australia Management as a
classic BOOT scheme. The A$615 million project was
capable of seating 110 000 spectators for the Olympic
Games, and is now being reconfigured, following the
games, to provide a capacity of 80 000 spectators.
Relationships and contractual arrangements
The OCA granted the Stadium Australia Trust the
Trust Lease on the completion date of the stadium,
being March 1999. The term of the Trust Lease expires
on 31 January 2031 or, if the Project agreement is
terminated before this date, on the date of termination
of the project agreement. On the lease expiry date, the
ownership and operational rights of the project trans-
fers to the government (OCA) for nominal considera-
tion. Up until that time, the Trust Lease covers, by
lease and exclusive licence, the land on which Stadium
Australia is constructed. The Trust Lease does not
however, cover the precinct or adjacent area. The Trust
has in turn granted the sublease and sub-licence over
the same land to Stadium Australia Management.
Stadium Australia Management is therefore the
operational entity of the group which generates revenue
from operation of the facility. From this revenue
Stadium Australia Management is required to meet
certain operating expenses. The Sublease obliges Sta-
dium Australia Management to make quarterly fixed
and variable rental payments to the Trust. The rental
income received by the Trust is used to meet payments
to the major maintenance reserve, the principal and
interest obligations under the debt documents, admin-
istration expenses and payment obligations to OCA
under the Trust Lease and the Project Agreement
(Stadium Australia Group, 1996a).
Beyond this intricate web of legal relationships, the
Trust has an appointed Trustee. Perpetual Trustee
Company Limited is one of the largest independent
trust companies in Australia and has this responsibility.
The Trust manager is Tower Hill Investment Managers
Limited, a company jointly owned by Hambros and
Multiplex (Stadium Australia Group, 1996a).
Financing the project
Financing of Stadium Australia has been as unique as
the stadium itself. The approach broke a number of
financing barriers because of a unique set of structures
and an innovative approach. The Stadium Australia
Group is a publicly funded group. According to a
Senior Manager, interviewed for this research project,
of Stadium Australia Management Limited ‘We are a
publicly listed entity and we were founded on our
ability to raise both debt and equity…of the initial
A$550 million investment, the public float raised
A$350 million. The float was unsuccessful in that it
finished short, but from a stadium viewpoint, it didn’t
make an enormous difference to us because the
underwriters paid the shortfall’.
The project is stated to have a total development
cost of A$615.2 million. This cost includes design and
construction costs of Stadium Australia and the
associated precinct area; fitout costs of the stadium
(apart from the fitout of private suites leased to third
parties); the cost of reconfiguring the stadium and
precinct area after the Olympics; development costs
including those incurred during the bid process, design
fees, listing and legal fees, stamp duty, financial
advisory fees, accounting taxation advice and those
to achieve financial close including marketing; pre-
opening costs incurred prior to the project completion
date; and financing costs including equity underwriting
fees, debt-related fees and costs, funding for a debt
service reserve account and capitalized interest on the
construction loan facility (Stadium Australia Group,
1996b).
Equity funding for the project was raised via gold and
platinum investors, founders and commercial investors.
The capital structure of the Trust and Stadium Aus-
tralia Management was such that at financial close,
investors would hold or be obliged or entitled to
subscribe for approximately 97.3 million units in the
Trust, and an identical number of shares in Stadium
Australia Management. The time obligations for pay-
ment of these investments were different, with gold and
platinum investors (or underwriters take-up) being paid
before financial close, while most founders and com-
mercial investors’ subscriptions were required to be
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made within 5 days of project completion (Stadium
Australia Group, 1996b).
The innovative techniques employed on the financing
of Stadium Australia helped to break several barriers.
These included introducing the first Australian Stock
Exchange (ASX)-listed lifestyle product. It was also the
first triple-stapled listed product. Most shares on the
ASX are simple products which involve straight owner-
ship of equity. Stapled products involve add-ons which
are designed to make the overall product more attractive
or to suit the particular needs of the project. In the
original float offerings, gold and platinum packages
involved three things – Olympic tickets, membership
entitlements and equity investment; thus the recognition
of a triple-stapled product. Each unit in the Trust is
stapled to a share in Stadium Australia Management.
The ability to attract equity investors into a BOOT
project is only a component of the overall financing
requirements. Ability to raise debt and attract organ-
izations willing to offer these arrangements is the other
significant component. The primary debt funding for
Stadium Australia was a Construction Loan Facility
and now a Term Loan Facility. ANZ Bank and ABN
AMRO agreed to provide a A$161 million Construc-
tion Loan Facility to the Trust under the terms of the
Construction Loan Facility Terms Sheet.
The project’s revenue sources
The future financial success of the Trust and Stadium
Australia Management depends substantially on their
ability to generate corporate hospitality revenues and
membership subscriptions. The achievement of these
revenue targets will depend on the number and type of
events held at Stadium Australia. Revenue generated
from corporate hospitality and membership subscrip-
tions over the 32 years concession period, need to be
adequate to cover interest payment, debt repayment,
dividends on equity investment, operational costs and
ideally a sufficient profit margin.
Corporate hospitality revenues are expected to be the
largest contributor towards operating revenue. Fees
from Stadium Australia Club are also expected to be a
significant revenue source. These two sources together
are expected to contribute approximately 65% of the
revenue of Stadium Australia Management in the year
ending 30 June 2002. This is anticipated to be the first
year with a full season of sporting events. During the
Olympic period in 2000, Stadium Australia Manage-
ment will receive negligible income from the Sydney
Organising Committee for the Olympic Games
(SOCOG). Food and beverage sales, merchandising,
event rentals and signage rights outside the Olympic
period form part of the anticipated operating revenue
(Stadium Australia Group, 1996b).
RESULTS
The culmination of reviewing contract summaries,
project documentation and discussions with several
key project personnel is evident in the following critical
success factor framework (Table 1) specific to Stadium
Australia. The ‘ticks’ identify which particular success
factor is applicable to the relevant party managing the
success factors and includes a summary of the key
issues or responses from the interviewees.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The procurement of Stadium Australia under BOOT,
is in accordance with Australian Government’s
increased acceptance of alternative forms of project
procurement and search for private sector infrastruc-
ture investment. Both the literature and case study
confirmed the critical importance of consortium struc-
ture as a success factor in winning BOOT projects and
the successful operation of them. The case study
identified that the consortium had a wealth of expertise,
considerable experience, high profile and a good
reputation. This played a significant role in the
consortiums successful bid. The literature stated the
critical importance of a well organized and defined
structure for the parties taking a stake in a BOOT
project. The literature also noted the importance of
reputation and profile among the participating parties
as a success factor in winning project bids.
The literature stated that ‘…choosing the most
suitable project consortium is the single greatest deter-
minant of the success or failure’ (UNIDO, 1996). The
case study reflected much of that comment as a
member of the Senior Management team of Stadium
Australia identified that ‘a crucial success factor of the
project was that team members got on very well in a
trusting relationship’.
The literature progresses to list the following factors
necessary for the success of such a project. The way
that the case study project was found to address each of
the issues follows each point.
1. Market concerns with regard to competition and the
flexibility to adjust to new markets.
The case study revealed Stadium Australia’s flexi-
bility to cater for different or new markets. This is
evidenced by the Post-Olympic re-configuration of
the layout to allow cricket and football matches.
Market concerns with regard to existing competition
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were not seen as a major threat given the advantages
expected in achieving better economies of scale with
the larger venue. Some risk mitigation was however
offered within the project agreement with regard to
limiting the effect of introducing competitive venues
within a 50-km distance.
2. Concerns with pricing. As the facility may have a
degree of monopoly power, the government may
wish to regulate fees and charges.
The only concern revealed by the case study with
regard to pricing are in association with the
operational revenue risk previously described.
3. Consideration for the quality of infrastructure which
actually feeds the new facility.
The case study revealed this factor as an important
issue, with particular regard to transportation within
the Homebush Bay region. The Transportation
Implementation Masterplan outlined OCA’s
responsibilities in providing this infrastructure which
the stadium obviously depends on.
4. Relationships with the ‘large’ organizations antici-
pated to use the facility as a hub or essential part of
their operation.
The case study revealed agreements with a number
of project participants who partially underwrite
revenues for the facility. Beyond this, several agree-
ments have been made with organizations such
as the National Rugby League for the staging of a
minimum numbers of events.
The project’s significant critical success factors
During the research interview process all participants
identified the following key CSFs as significant and vital
in order maintain a sustainable project:
1. The consortium had a wealth of expertise, consid-
erable experience, high profile and a good reputa-
tion.
2. An efficient approval process that assisted the
stakeholders in a very tight timeframe.
3. Innovation in the financing and equity raising
methods meant that the consortium had a very good
‘winning’ strategy. They demonstrated the ability to
raise both debt and equity.
A Senior Construction Manager during the preferred
tenderer and early construction stages of the project
described a further critical success factor, perhaps
overshadowed only by the innovative ‘winning’, ‘a
crucial success factor of the project was also the
representatives of the two key companies involved
(Multiplex and Hambros). These people were
extremely committed, dynamic, aggressive and yetTr
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accommodating. Multiplex and Hambros were a very
good fit. The team members got on very well and
worked together in a trusting relationship’.
This comment reiterates the critical success factors of
teamwork and complimentary style, consortium struc-
ture and general trust as identified in the framework
established from reviewing the literature. Asked whe-
ther it is likely that, in hindsight, any of the stakeholders
would change their approach, the senior construction
manager thought not. He qualified this by commenting
that this was easy to state given that the comment came
from within the consortium that actually won the bid.
Comment was however, made of a different approach
taken by OCA on subsequent Olympic projects pro-
cured under similar methods, ‘In hindsight from a
government perspective, instead of selecting a single
preferred tenderer as early as they did, they would have
taken two consortiums further down the evaluation
process in the hope of realizing further competition
benefits’.
The case study project has shown evidence in all
respects of fulfilling the success factors required for a
sustainable operation.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of BOOT schemes provides a means
for developing the infrastructure of a country without
directly impacting on the governments budgetary con-
straints. Consideration given to BOOT characteristics
and perceptions has allowed the development of an
overall critical success factor framework. With applica-
tion to BOOT projects generally, the framework serves
the purpose of raising awareness to factors at an early
planning stage, such that further consideration can be
implemented where applicable. The framework con-
siders issues from all perspectives throughout the
construction and development phase through to the
operational and eventual transfer phase. The underta-
king of a case study allowed the identification of critical
success factors relevant to a large infrastructure project
procured under the BOOT concept.
The most significant critical success factor applicable
to the project in terms of operation is revenue sustain-
ability. The success factor underlying this issue is the
logic of achieving better economies of scale out of a
much larger venue. In considering the most significant
success factor at the developmental stages, the issue of
consortium structure was most evident in both the
literature and the case study. The consortium structure
was of an extremely complex nature, yet consisted of
teamwork, complimentary styles and trust among key
parties. Contributing to the successful consortium bid,
this array of companies demonstrated a wealth of
expertise, considerable experience, high profile and a
good reputation. However, although this success factor
is considered most significant up until completion of
the construction phase, it has substantial consequence
for the entire project life. As such, extensive considera-
tion and planning given towards the consortium struc-
ture may be viewed as the single greatest determinant of
success or failure of BOOT projects.
The next stage of the work is to refine the CSFs
highlighted in this study and to identify their key
attributes that make them success factors. Refined
success factors are tested in continuing work case
studying BOOT projects that were procured after
Stadium Australia.
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